This paper extends the work in Orphanides (2003) by re-examining the empirical evidence for a Taylor rule in a nonlinear framework. In doing so, it updates the Greenbook dataset used by the afore mentioned author to the most recent available period.
Introduction
John Taylor (Taylor, 1993) -formalized the notion that monetary policy in the United States could be usefully described by a simple rule, according to which, the Federal Reserve sets the target for the Federal Funds Rate in order to establish the equilibrium level of the real interest rate; with adjustments aimed at correcting deviations of the rate of inflation from its target, and of output from potential. Much of the empirical literature on the Taylor rule has focused on a forward-looking specification in a departure from the original backward-looking rule -see Gertler (1998, 2000) , Orphanides (2003) among others. A forward-looking policy reaction function is arguably a better characterization of the objectives of central banks.
A number of recent policy evaluation studies highlight the importance of using information that was actually available to the policy makers when they were making their interest-setting decisions - Orphanides (2001 Orphanides ( , 2002 Orphanides ( , and 2003 . These studies show that estimates of policy reaction functions based on retrospective (expost) data often lead to serious mischaracterizations of the intended policy by the monetary authority. Orphanides (2002) argues that the Great Inflation of the 1970's, which is generally viewed as the most dramatic failure of macroeconomic policy in the United States since the founding of the Federal Reserve, does not necessarily reflect the absence of a coherent and disciplined monetary policy during this period. It is shown that -even if the Fed had been following a standard forwardlooking Taylor rule -severe underestimates of future inflation and of the natural rate of unemployment that occurred in real-time decision making, would have led to settings of the Federal Funds Rate substantially below the levels indicated using ex-post data. The Federal Funds Rate during the 1970's was very close to the level recommended by a standard forward-looking Taylor rule implemented with ex-post data.
The significance of using real-time data in empirical work as opposed to ex-post data seems to vary from case to case. Molodtsova et al. (2008) find that estimated Taylor rules based on revised (ex-post) data and real-time data differ more for Germany than for the U.S. Further, Taylor rules estimated with real-time data point to differences between U.S. and German monetary policies. The same authors report evidence of out-of-sample predictability for the dollar/deutchemark nominal exchange rate using forecasts for interest rate differentials from Taylor rules estimated with real-time data. Taylor rules based on revised data do not improve nominal exchange rate predictability.
The use of real-time data simplifies estimation by allowing researchers to use nonlinear least squares as opposed to IV or GMM procedures that are required when retrospective data is being used. Further, estimation using real-time data avoids identification issues in forward-looking Taylor rules. An and Schorfheide (2007) and Cochrane (2007) argue that there are important parameter identification issues in DSGE models. Given that monetary policy rules characterize many DSGE models, identification may be a problem. Mavroeidis (2010) used identificationrobust procedures (see Stock and Wright (2000) and Kleibergen (2005) ) in his evaluation of the U.S. Taylor rule and found that identification issues should be taken seriously.
More recent theoretical and empirical work has explored the possibility that the policy reaction function is nonlinear. Dolado et al. (2005) and Surico (2007) argue that the Federal Reserve is minimizing an asymmetric loss function that assigns different weights to positive and negative deviations of inflation from its target and positive and negative values of the output gap. Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) search for a specification of the policymaker's loss function that would lead to an asymmetric response to disinflation. In what they describe as an "opportunistic approach" to disinflation, when inflation is moderately above or below its long run objective -within a band defined by an upper and lower threshold-the Federal Reserve should not take deliberate action by changing the Fed Funds rate. Instead, the Fed should rely on favourable aggregate supply and/or demand shocks to steer inflation toward its long run target. On the other hand, should inflation veer outside the inaction band, the Fed should adjust the Fed Funds rate aggressively. Qin and Enders (2008) , using real-time data for the U.S., compare the insample and the out-of-sample properties of a number of linear and nonlinear Taylor rules as a means of model selection. Taylor and Davradakis (2006) test for nonlinearity in the conduct of monetary policy by the Bank of England using ex-post data. Bunzel and Enders (2010) use the real-time values of U.S. GDP in order to account for the fact that real GDP is often subject to substantial revisions. They investigate the possibility that the Taylor Rule should be formulated as a threshold process such that the Federal Reserve acts more aggressively when inflation is high than when it is low, or when the output gap is negative rather than positive. They find that there is a strong case to be made, based on statistical evidence, that the Taylor rule is a threshold process that is consistent with an opportunistic monetary policy. This paper extends the work in Orphanides (2003) by re-examining the empirical evidence for a Taylor rule in a nonlinear framework. In doing so, it updates the Greenbook data set used by the afore mentioned author to the most recent available period (2003:4) . A three-regime threshold regression model, motivated by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) , is utilized to capture the possibly asymmetric policy reaction function of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The theoretical foundations for such an approach to monetary policy are further discussed in Section 2.
The empirical model employed in this paper is very general and nests a number of more restrictive models in it. One is a two-regime model -Bunzel and Enders (2010) -with active monetary policy above and below the single threshold, another is a model with active monetary policy when inflation is running above the single threshold, but inaction (random-walk behaviour) when it lies below the threshold. The most restrictive case is represented by a linear model such as the one considered in Orphanides (2003) . The thresholds in the nonlinear models are estimated endogenously and testing down from the most general model to the linear case is accomplished through sequential likelihood-ratio tests. A similar modelling strategy was followed by Taylor and Davradakis (2006) who used retrospective data for the U.K. Our results, using data that were available to the Federal Reserve in real time and span the period 1982:3-2003:4, indicate that the Fed's policy reaction function during this period was asymmetric.
To assess the robustness of our results, we compare the specification of the Taylor rule used in Orphanides (2003) to other specifications suggested in the empirical literature using out-of-sample forecasts and standard information criteria (AIC, BIC). The best performing specifications were employed in the estimation of the nonlinear models. The nonlinearity results were generally robust to the specification of the linear Taylor rule.
Further checks for robustness of the results were conducted by re-estimating the nonlinear models using alternative measures of the output gap and assuming different types of asymmetry. Specifically, following Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) and Lo and Piger (2003) we tested for nonlinearity using the output gap as the threshold. Further, following Florio (2006) we tested for asymmetries with respect to the change in the Fed Funds rate.
The following Section discusses an encompassing empirical specification for a nonlinear Taylor rule. Section 3 is devoted to model selection for the linear Taylor rule. Section 4 reviews the econometric methodology used in the estimation and testing of the nonlinear models. Section 5 reports the empirical results and tests for asymmetric policy response in the context of our baseline nonlinear model. Section 6 explores the sensitivity of the baseline results with respect to alternative specifications of the Taylor rule and types of asymmetry. Section 7 concludes.
An Encompassing Policy Reaction Function
The original Taylor rule, henceforth referred to as the classic rule, postulates that the target for the short-run nominal interest rate, i * t , is set as follows:
where r * is the long-run equilibrium real interest rate (assumed to be constant and known to the central bank), π * is the target inflation rate (also assumed to be con-stant), π t is the the inflation rate at time t, and y t is the percent real output gap. Potential real output is assumed to be exogenous. Equation (1) can be written as: Clarida et al. (1998) point out that ζ π > 0 and ζ y > 0 reflect stabilizing behaviour on the part of the central bank. For example, a one percent increase in inflation will result in an upward revision of the target for the overnight interest rate by 1 + ζ π -equation (2). For ζ π > 0, the latter exceeds the rise in inflation and raises the target real rate. This response slows down real economic activity to counter inflation. If on the other hand, ζ π and/or ζ y are negative, monetary policy is "accommodative". In the latter case, Clarida et al. (2000) argue that self-fulfilling bursts of inflation and output may be possible.
Orphanides (2003) shows that Friedman-type money growth rules can be reformulated along the lines of (2). Specifically,
where the Fed Funds Rate targets deviations of real output growth from potential output growth. Empirical work on Taylor-type rules has been based on two variations on equations (2) and (3). The first concerns forward looking rules, where inflation and the output gap are replaced with expected values of these variables. Expectations are assumed to be rational conditional on information available through time t − 1.
The second variation is based on interest rate smoothing exercised by the monetary authority as suggested by Goodfriend (1991) . Interest rate smoothing may be the result of central bank concerns about financial market disruption in the face of drastic changes in the Fed Funds Rate. Similarly, interest rate smoothing may help avoid large policy reversals that would be damaging to central bank credibility. The partial adjustment hypothesis, outlined below, shows that the Fed Funds Rate adjusts to close the gap between the actual rate and its target gradually:
where 1 > φ > 0, and (1 − φ ) represents the degree of interest rate smoothing. Equation (4) is re-arranged as:
Substituting in (5) the expression for the target Fed Funds Rate resulting from equations (2) and (3), we get a dynamic expression describing the Fed Funds Rate in the short and medium run:
For estimation purposes, equation (6) will be written as:
where ε is an i.i.d. disturbance with zero mean and constant variance. Further, Following Orphanides (2003) , we utilize the following empirical specification of (7) i
where π a t+3 = p t+3 − p t−1 is the year-ahead inflation forecast based on information available at time t − 1. ∆ a y t+3 = (y t+3 − y t−1 ) − (y * t+3 − y * t−1 ) is the year-ahead growth forecast relative to potential. Finally, y t−1 is the estimate of the output gap for quarter t − 1 available during quarter t.
Equation (8) nests a number of linear policy reaction functions. For example, setting θ i = θ ∆y = 0 yields the inflation forecast version of the classic Taylor rule. The restriction θ i = 0, θ ∆y = −θ y > 0 is equivalent to the classic Taylor rule that targets both inflation and output-gap forecasts. Setting θ i = 1, θ y = 0 and θ ∆y > 0 corresponds to a natural growth targeting rule. Finally, setting θ π = θ ∆y = θ y = 0, and θ i = 1 corresponds to random-walk behaviour of the Fed Funds rate.
In order to motivate a possibly nonlinear Taylor rule, Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) postulate a conventional macromodel consisting of an aggregate demand relationship and an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. Their model is summarized as follows:
where y t is the deviation of output from potential (measured in logarithms) and the parameter ρ is a positive fraction capturing the persistence of the output gap. The deviation of the real interest rate from its steady-state level is denoted by r t − r * , σ is a positive parameter, and u t is an aggregate demand shock. Further, π t and π e t are inflation and expected inflation respectively, δ is a positive parameter, and e t is an aggregate supply shock.
The policy maker is assumed to suffer loss from deviations of inflation from its intermediate target (π t − π) and deviations of output from potential according to the following loss function:
where ξ ≥ 0, and ψ ≥ 0. It is further assumed that the intermediate target for inflation is a positive fraction λ of the lagged inflation rate (i.e. π = λ π t−1 ). The lower the value of λ , the more aggressively the intermediate inflation target is adjusted to its long-run value of zero. It is shown that if neither the demand nor the supply shock can be anticipated, and inflation expectations are static (π e t = π t−1 ) the optimal rule for the policy maker is opportunistic regarding its response to inflation:
where
are an upper and a lower threshold respectively.
The opportunistic monetary policy rule suggests that as long as inflation is within the band defined by a lower and upper threshold π t−1 , π t−1 , it does not warrant a policy response. Once inflation exceeds the upper threshold, it triggers an increase in the nominal interest rate intended to bring the real interest rate up toward its long-run level. An analogous argument can be made for rates of inflation that are below the lower threshold. From an empirical standpoint, this model suggests that optimal monetary policy reinforces the mean-reverting properties of the ex-post real interest rate when expected inflation lies outside a certain band.
The width of the policy-inaction band is determined by the values of the parameters entering the expressions for the thresholds. For example, a monetary authority with a gradualist approach to disinflation (high λ ) will have a relatively wide band of policy inaction. The same conclusion holds for a monetary authority that faces a flat expectations-augmented Phillips curve (low δ ) and/or experiences high loss from deviations of output from potential (high ψ).
Following Taylor and Davradakis (2006) , we model possibly asymmetric behaviour on the part of the Fed by a three-regime threshold regression model. When the one-year-ahead inflation forecast lies within a certain band described by a lower and an upper threshold (τ − , τ − ), the Fed may adopt a less active policy stance. In the extreme, policy inaction may lead to random-walk behaviour of the Fed Funds Rate. On the other hand, when the inflation forecast breaches the upper threshold, the Fed may adjust the Fed Funds Rate more aggressively. Similarly, when the inflation forecast breaches the lower threshold, fears of deflation may force the Fed to act decisively by lowering the Fed Funds rate.
The model is summarized as follows:
In (13), ε t is a white noise disturbance common across regimes. The thresholds, τ − , τ − , are assumed to be unknown and will be determined endogenously. Within the band [τ − , τ − ] , policy inaction may lead to random walk behaviour of the Fed Funds rate. The latter is a testable hypothesis and will be investigated in Section 5 of the paper. Further, the Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) optimal policy reaction function implies a symmetric policy response to inflation in the two outer regimes (i.e. it implies the restriction α = γ, where α and γ are parameter vectors).
Linear Model Selection
Given that our nonlinearity tests focus on the specification of the Taylor rule used in Orphanides (2003) , it is important to compare it with other specifications used in the literature to assess its adequacy. In this section, we compare different specifications of the Taylor rule using out-of-sample forecasts and standard information criteria; namely the AIC and BIC. Bunzel and Enders (2010) and Qin and Enders (2008) used out-of-sample forecasts for model selection.
The dataset used in the paper was kindly supplied by Athanasios Orphanides from his JME (2003) The out-of-sample forecasts that are used to evaluate different linear specifications of the Taylor rule are generated as follows. Each Taylor rule specification was estimated over the sample period 1982:3-1995:4 and a one-step-ahead forecast for the interest rate was generated (1996:1 is the first out-of-sample forecast). The start of the estimation period (1982:3) was chosen for comparability with Orphanides (2003) . The linear models were estimated recursively -by adding one observation at a time -and making a new one-step-ahead forecast. The last out-ofsample forecasting period was 2003:4. The mean squared prediction errors (MSPE) and biases are reported in Table 1 .
We consider various forward-looking specifications of the linear Taylor rule, which are all variants of equation (8) -labeled as model M 3 in Table 1 . Model M 3 , the baseline model, is written as:
Model M 1 assumes no interest rate smoothing
Model M 2 modifies M 1 by excluding the growth component of the output gap
Model M 4 is M 3 with a second lag of the interest rate:
M 5 is M 4 without the growth component of the output gap:
Finally, M 6 is M 5 with only 1 lag of the interest rate:
In addition, we have estimated two simple autoregressive models of the interest rate for comparison. M 7 is a simple AR(1):
Table 1 provides information that helps rank the alternative models in terms of goodness of fit and out-of-sample forecasting performance. On the basis of very high values of the AIC and BIC (note also the high MPSE), we rule out models M 1 and M 2 from further consideration. The simple autoregressive models are also ruled out due to high values of the information criteria; even though they are comparable to the selected models in terms of forecasting precision. As Qin and Enders (2008) point out, this could be explained by forecasting results being influenced by omitted structural breaks (see also Clark and McCracken (2003) ).
On the basis of information criteria, our baseline model (M 3 ) comes second only to model M 4 (M 3 with a second lag of the interest rate). However, the second lag of the interest rate in model M 4 is statistically insignificant at standard levels of significance. Further, models that do not include the growth of the output gap (models M 5 and M 6 ) outperform all other models in terms of forecast accuracy and come close to models M 3 and M 4 in terms of information criteria. Given that models M 4 , M 5 , and M 6 perform well relative to the baseline specification, they will be used in the nonlinear estimation to provide evidence on the robustness of the nonlinearity results with respect to model specification.
Nonlinear Estimation Strategy
Estimation of the three-regime threshold model, (13), is implemented by defining two dummy variables:
≤ τ − and I t = 0 otherwise Write:
Equation (14) is estimated by conditional sequential linear least squares with an adjustment for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. For a given pair of values of τ − , τ − , estimates of the αs, β s, and γs can be obtained together with the residual variance. The value of τ − , τ − that minimizes the residual sum of squares is the LS estimate of the thresholds. Hansen (1996) has shown that a grid search over the interval τ − , τ − that minimizes the sum of squared residuals, yields consistent estimates of the thresholds and the model parameters under fairly weak regularity assumptions.
Tests for asymmetric behaviour take place by successively restricting the general model (14) to a two-regime model (τ − = τ − = τ). The restrictions are tested through a likelihood ratio test
where T is the number of observations, RSS restricted and RSS unrestricted are the residual sum of squares of the restricted and unrestricted models respectively. If a tworegime model cannot be rejected by the data, the null hypothesis of linearity is tested by setting the parameter vectors α and γ equal. An F − test is inappropriate in this case since the threshold is estimated together with other parameters of the model. Hansen (1996) shows how to perform a non-parametric bootstrap procedure in order to derive the empirical significance levels of the test statistics.
The following steps describe the estimation and testing procedures:
1. The data on π a t+3 is sorted in ascending order. The top and bottom 15% of the sorted data is trimmed in order to establish the minimum and maximum values for the thresholds (τ − , τ − ). This is done in order to insure that at least 30% of the sorted observations will lie outside and inside the middle regime. This way, the estimated model is not unduly influenced by a few important outliers.
2. A grid search is performed within τ − , τ − . The values of the thresholds that minimize the residual sum of squares are selected together with the model estimates of the αs, β s, and γs. 3. In order to implement the testing-down procedure mentioned above, we compute the Likelihood Ratio test statistic (15) conditional on the estimated optimal thresholds. 4. Given LR T (τ), we compute a simulated p value (marginal significance level).
The null hypothesis, the restricted model, is rejected for a low p value.
The steps involved in the non-parametric bootstrap are outlined in Taylor and Davradakis (2006) . The only difference in the present application is that the number of replications is set at 5000 instead of 10000 in their case.
Nonlinear Estimation Results
The encompassing policy reaction function (14) Table 2 . Inspection of the results revealed that the coefficient estimates for the middle regime are statistically insignificant with the exception of the coefficient of the lagged interest rate that is very close to one. We restricted the middle regime to a random walk as indicated by the following model (M 33r )
We re-estimated M 33r and formally tested the restriction utilizing the simulated p values reported in Table 3 . The restricted model cannot be rejected at the conventional levels of significance (LR T (τ) = 10.90, p−value=0.14) and its estimated thresholds remain unchanged (τ − = 2.8%, τ − = 3.9%).
We continued with our general-to-specific testing strategy by restricting M 33 to a two-regime model (M 32 )
M 32 is rejected in the presence of M 33 at the 5 percent significance level (LR T (τ) = 23.69, p−value=0.01) and the estimated single threshold is τ = 3.9%.
Further restricting M 32 , yields the linear model estimated by Orphanides (2003) :
M 31 is categorically rejected in the presence of M 33 (LR T (τ) = 61.57, p− value=0.00). Further, the coefficient estimates of M 31 are very similar to those reported by Orphanides (2003) for the sample period 1982:3-1997:4.
The results so far, suggest that the three-regime model seems to fit the data best. The Federal Funds rate in the middle regime approximates a random walk, which is consistent with policy inaction by the Fed when expected inflation deviates moderately from its long-run target. When the inflation forecast breaches the upper threshold the Fed Funds rate is raised aggressively to stem inflation (α 2 = 1.36 with standard error = 0.49). This estimate implies that a one percent increase in inflation above the upper threshold results in an upward revision of the target for the Fed Funds rate by roughly 2.3 percent (α 2 = (1 − α 1 )(1 + ζ π ) or 1 + ζ π = 1.36/(1 − 0.39) = 2.3). The latter, clearly raises the real Fed Funds rate and is intended to cool down the economy. When the inflation forecast falls below the lower threshold the Fed Funds rate is lowered in real terms to reflate the economy (γ 2 = 0.61 with standard error= 0.17). This estimate implies that a one percent decline in the inflation forecast below the lower threshold results in a downward revision of the target for the Fed Funds rate by roughly 3 percent (γ 2 = (1 − γ 1 )(1 + ζ π ) or 1 + ζ π = 0.61/(1 − 0.80) = 3.0). The last result suggests that the Fed has reacted more vigorously to fears of deflation during the sample period.
Interestingly, in the upper inflation regime the Fed does not respond to the output gap (α 4 is statistically insignificant). By contrast, when the inflation forecast is low, the Fed targets the output gap (γ 4 = 0.23 with standard error= 0.04). The Fed's reaction to inflation in the linear model (M 31 : α 2 = 0.33 with standard error= 0.11) implies 1 + ζ π = 0.33/(1 − 0.89) = 3.0.
Further, the coefficient estimates of the lagged interest rate suggest that there is asymmetry in the degree of interest rate smoothing exercised by the Fed. Specifically, when the forecast of inflation is above the upper threshold, the coefficient of the lagged interest rate is estimated at α 1 = 0.39. By contrast, when the inflation forecast is below the lower threshold, the same coefficient is estimated at γ 1 = 0.80 suggesting that the Fed was more decisive in raising the Fed Funds Rate than in lowering it during the sample period.
The above results suggest that the policy reaction functions in the two outer regimes are different. To test this hypothesis formally, we set α = γ (where α and γ are parameter vectors) and perform a Wald test. The results, reported in Table 3 under "Symmetry", suggest that the symmetry assumption is rejected categorically.
Finally, we tested our preferred model (M 33r ) against the inflation forecast version of the classic Taylor rule by setting α 1 = α 3 = γ 1 = γ 3 = 0. The Wald test, reported in Table 3 under "Classic", soundly rejects the joint hypothesis of no interest rate smoothing and lack of output growth targeting by policy makers.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we test the robustness of our main empirical findings based on model M 33 along a number of dimensions. Namely, with respect to alternative specifications of the linear Taylor rule, alternative measures of the output gap, and alternative types of asymmetry.
To assess the sensitivity of the nonlinearity results reported in the previous Section, with respect to model specification, we present nonlinear estimates for models M 43 , M 53 and M 63 in Table 2 . The nonlinearity tests for the same models are reported in Table 3 .
Inference results with respect to model M 4 (two lags of the interest rate) are very similar to the case of M 3 (only 1 lag). In particular, both the linear and tworegime models were rejected in favor of the three-regime policy reaction function (although the p-value rose from 0.01 to 0.08 when testing the three-regime against the two-regime reaction function). The middle regime exhibited random-walk behavior, as was the case for model M 3 .
Removing the growth of the output gap from the specification -models M 5 and M 6 -affects the nonlinearity results. Focusing on model M 5 (the results are qualitatively similar for model M 6 ), we found that the two-regime model is not rejected when compared to the three-regime model (p−value=0.15). We also compared the two-regime unrestricted nonlinear model with a two-regime model in which the lower regime is characterized by random walk behavior of the interest rate. The restricted two-regime model was not rejected (p−value=0.94).
The results of our sensitivity analysis with respect to alternative specifications of the linear Taylor rule support our main finding; namely, that the linearity restriction in an encompassing model of the Fed's policy reaction function is rejected in all cases. In particular, allowing for a Taylor rule that does not contain a term with output gap growth, model M 53 , yields a two-regime threshold model with an inflation threshold of 3.9%. Our results indicate that in the lower regime, the interest rate is best described by a random walk.
The information criteria and the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy measure (MSPE), reported in Table 2 , suggest that models including an additional lag of the interest rate (M 43 ) or those excluding the output growth term (M 53 , M 52 , M 63 ) are very competitive. However, the coefficient estimates of expected inflation in the upper regime are imprecisely estimated in the case of M 53 , M 52 , and M 63 . Model M 43 (the three-regime model with 2 lags of the interest rate) implies that the Fed reacts aggressively when the inflation rate is high (coefficient α 2 is high -1.52 -and statistically significant). In response to an increase in expected inflation by 1 percent the Fed increases the policy interest rate by 1+ ζ π = 1.52/0.7 = 2.8 percent compared to 2.3 percent in the model with only 1 lag (M 33 ).
To assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative measures of the output gap, we follow Nikolsko-Rzevskyy (2011) and develop series for the output gap from "vintage" data. A description of the vintage data set is provided by Croushore and Stark (2001) together with the rationale for its construction and empirical relevance 1 . We detrend the log of real output using two detrending methods; a quadratic time trend, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ = 1600. The resulting series for the output gap were found to be highly correlated with the Greenbook measure by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2011).
Model M 6 was selected for the sensitivity analysis because it does not involve an output growth forecast variable for which vintage data was not available. The forecast of annual inflation 3 periods ahead, π a t+3 , is from the Greenbook. Tables 4 and 5 report the estimation results and nonlinearity tests for model M 6 using alternative measures for the output gap series.
The inference results in Table 5 indicate that the restrictions placed on the three-regime model by linearity are rejected in all cases regardless of the measure of the output gap used. Further, the restrictions placed by a two-regime threshold model on the encompassing model cannot be rejected in all cases and the same is true for the restricted three-regime model with a random walk in the middle regime. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the latter model. The estimated thresholds are very similar for the three definitions of the output gap. The most notable change in the parameter estimates has to do with the coefficient of the output gap when HP-filtered vintage data for output is used. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the high expected inflation regime (α 4 = 0.29). It is slightly higher and very precisely estimated in the low inflation regime (γ 4 = 0.34). The same coefficient is statistically insignificant in the high expected inflation regime when either Greenbook or quadratically detrended vintage data is used. This paper has, so far, focused on a particular type of asymmetry in the Federal Reserve's policy reaction function; namely, asymmetric response to the inflation forecast. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) and Dolado, et al. (2005) have explored theoretically and empirically this type of nonlinearity in the Taylor rule. Their findings suggest that the Federal Reserve pursues a more aggressive policy when inflation is above the target rather than below the target. Our baseline threeregime threshold model estimated with real-time data -model M 33 -has confirmed the inflation asymmetry but suggests that the Fed has reacted more vigorously to fears of deflation during the sample period 1982:3-2003:4.
Cukierman and Gerlach (2003), have argued that the output gap is what triggers asymmetric policy response on the part of the Fed. Their model postulates a policy-maker loss function that includes both inflation and the output gap when the latter is negative (recessionary) but only inflation when the output gap is positive. They justify their modelling choice by quoting a Fed insider (Blinder, 1998, pp. 19, 20) "In most situations the central bank will take far more political heat when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inflation than when it eases preemptively to avoid higher unemployment". The same authors report evidence based on a sample spanning the period 1960-2005 suggesting that the dominant nonlinear response passed from inflation in the earlier part of this period to the output gap once price stability had been established (after 1987).
We re-estimate the nonlinear models of the Taylor rule using the output gap as the threshold variable in order to provide additional evidence on this type of nonlinearity using real-time data. Tables 6 and 7 report the results of using the output gap as the threshold variable in our three-regime encompassing model.
Linearity is soundly rejected. The restricted three-regime threshold model, with the middle regime being a random walk, cannot be rejected. Further, the restrictions placed on the encompassing model by a two-regime model cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. The symmetry restriction (α = γ) and the no-interest-rate-smoothing restriction (α 1 = γ 1 = 0) are both soundly rejected.
Focusing on the estimated coefficients of the restricted three-regime model (M 33r ) in Table 6 , we find that the Fed reacts to a 1 percent rise in expected inflation by increasing the Fed Funds Rate by 2.1 percent in the upper regime and 1.1 percent in the lower regime. Thus, the Fed is less hawkish vis-à-vis inflation when the real economy is perceived to be in a weaker state. Similarly, the interest rate smoothing coefficient is lower in the lower regime (γ 1 = 0.23 vs α 1 = 0.71) suggesting that the monetary authority is less decisive in changing rates in the midst of a weak economic outlook. These results are broadly consistent with the main conjecture in Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) . Finally, the Fed reacts to rising output gap in the higher output gap regime by raising rates (α 4 = 0.33 (0.06)) but is passive in the lower output gap regime (γ 4 = 0.01 (0.04)). The results are qualitatively similar when the parameter estimates from the two-regime model (M 32 ) are used. Florio (2006) explores possible asymmetries in the degree of interest rate smoothing depending on the direction of the monetary policy stance. When the central bank is more concerned with recessions/deflation, it is possible that a monetary policy tightening (∆i t−1 > 0) -that can lead to a recession -increases policy gradualism. Using the lagged change in interest rates (∆i t−1 ) as the threshold, she finds evidence of smoothing asymmetry both during the Volker (1979 Volker ( :3-1987 and the Greenspan (1987 Greenspan ( :3-2004 3) sample periods.
Using ∆i t−1 as the threshold in our three-regime model we test for the presence of asymmetries in policy gradualism during our sample period (1982:3-2003:4) and report the results in Tables 6 and 7 . The results in Table 7 suggest that the linear model is strongly rejected but the three-regime restricted model and, to a lesser extent, the two-regime model are not. Table 6 presents parameter estimates for the three-regime and the restricted models. We summarize our findings concentrating on the three-regime restricted model but the results are qualitatively similar for the two-regime model.
In an environment of rising interest rates the response of the policy instrument to a 1 percent rise in expected inflation is weaker than in an environment of declining interest rates (1.81% vs 3.42%). Further, the degree of policy gradualism is greater in a rising interest rate environment (α 1 = 0.74, γ 1 = 0.93) confirming Florio's findings.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has employed an updated version of the Greenbook dataset in Orphanides (2003) to extend his estimates of a U.S. policy reaction function to the nonlinear case. A three-regime threshold regression model, motivated by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) , was used for this purpose. In this framework, when inflation forecasts are within a moderate range around the long-run inflation target, the Fed is passive with regard to its interest rate setting policy. Within this range of inaction, the Fed relies on favourable aggregate demand and/or supply shocks to restore inflation to its desired long-run level. Without active Fed policy the Fed Funds Rate is buffeted by random shocks and resembles a random walk. On the contrary, when inflation forecasts veer outside the range of Fed tolerance, aggressive adjustments in the Fed Funds rate take place.
We have followed a general-to-specific approach whereby -through successive restrictions of the general model -we have tried to discover the model that best fits the data. Using the Orphanides (2003) specification of the linear Taylor rule, we have found that a two-regime model was rejected in the presence of the three-regime model described above. Similarly, the linear Taylor rule was categorically rejected in the presence of the three-regime model. Finally, the restriction that was not rejected by the data was that, in the middle regime, the Fed Funds Rate resembles a random walk. Our empirical results provide broad support for the Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) conjecture that the Fed behaves in an "opportunistic" fashion when it sets the Fed Funds Rate. However, the symmetry implication of the same model is soundly rejected by the data.
The sensitivity of the results was assessed with respect to alternative specifications of the linear Taylor rule, alternative measures of the output gap, and types of asymmetry. We found the nonlinearity results to be robust to all of the sensitivity tests -though in some cases a two-regime threshold model could not be rejected. Finally, the tests for different types of asymmetry seem to confirm the findings of previous studies in the literature.
Data Appendix
The Philadelphia Fed's dataset of Greenbook projections was obtained from an Excel file, which can be downloaded through the following link:
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/greenbook-data/ philadelphia-data-set.cfm.
The file contains two worksheets: one for real GNP/GDP and one for the GNP/GDP price index. Each column corresponds to a different quarter: QTR0 is the current-quarter projection; QTR1 is one quarter ahead, etc. The projections cover a variety of horizons, depending on what the Fed was forecasting at the time. The forecasts are for quarter-over-quarter rates of change, in annualized percentage points.
Greenbook forecasts for the output gap at various horizons were obtained from an Excel file, which can be downloaded through the following link:
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/greenbook-data/ gap-and-financial-data-set.cfm.
Finally, the Federal Funds rate that is released by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, was obtained from a text file downloadable at:http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15 FF O.txt.
The definitions of the variables follow Orphanides (2003) Forecast of the GDP deflator for t + 3 P t−1
Actual deflator for t − 1 as reported in t π a t+3 = (ln(P e t+3 ) − ln(P t−1 )) × 100 Forecast of annual inflation 3 periods ahead
Output Gap y e t+3 3-quarters ahead forecast of y t ∆ a y t+3 = (y 3 t+3 − y t−1 ) − (y e * t+3 − y * t−1 ) Year-ahead growth forecast relative to potential Notes: All models are linear. Coefficients indexed with a 0 are for the constant, with a 1 for the lagged interest rate, with 12 the second lag of the interest rate, with a 2 for the annual inflation forecast 3 quarters ahead, with a 3 for the year-ahead growth forecast, and with a 4 for the output gap. Estimation was performed for the period 1982:3 to 2003:4 using least squares. HAC standard errors are reported in parantheses . The entries for the bias and mean squared prediction error (MSPE) are for the out-of-sample forecasting exercise described in Section 3. Notes: The first index, i in M i j refers to the type of linear model while the second index, j, refers to the number of regimes. The index r is the restricted model obtained by imposing a random walk in the middle regime. The αs are for the upper regime, β s for the middle regime and the γs for the lower regime. Coefficients indexed with a 0 are for the constant, with a 1 for the lagged interest rate, with a 12 for the second lag of the interest rate, with a 2 for the inflation forecast, π a t+3 , with a 3 for the year-ahead growth forecast, ∆ a y t+3 , and with a 4 for the output gap, y t−1 . Estimation was performed using least squares for the period 1982:3 to 2003:4. HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. The entries for the bias and mean squared prediction errors (MSPE) are for the out-of-sample forecasting exercise. The threshold variable is the Greenbook forecast of annual inflation 3 quarters ahead. Notes: When comparing models the LR test, as described in Section 4, is used. The restricted model is always on the right. Column labeled "Symmetry" reports a Wald test for the null hypothesis α = γ in model M 33r . Column labeled "Classic Taylor" reports a Wald test for the null α 1 = α 3 = γ 1 = γ 3 = 0 in model M 33r . p− values are in parentheses. Notes: When comparing models the LR test, as described in Section 4, is used. The restricted model is always on the right. Column labeled "Symmetry" reports a Wald test for the null hypothesis α = γ in model M 63r . Column labeled "Classic Taylor" reports a Wald test for the null α 1 = γ 1 = 0 in model M 63r . p− values are in parentheses. Notes: When comparing models the LR test, as described in Section 4, is used. The restricted model is always on the right. Column labeled "Symmetry" reports a Wald test for the null hypothesis α = γ in model M 33r . Column labeled "Classic Taylor" reports a Wald test for the null α 1 = γ 1 = 0 in model M 33r . p− values are in parentheses.
